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Abstract 
There is a body of literature showing that donor-supported institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
are often captured by local elites, but this literature rarely touches upon whether elite capture is 
contingent on institutions. However, if this is the case, some institutions may provide political 
leverage for weaker groups, while others may sustain existing or traditional relations of power. 
The aim of this study of three cases of donor-supported institutions in Burkina Faso is to 
understand why close relatives of traditional chiefs invest in gaining control over a municipality, 
while showing only limited interest in gaining control of village groups and the electricity 
cooperative. The article argues that while local actors are generally attracted by development rents 
from donor-supported institutions, relatives of traditional chiefs seem to value the symbolic 
importance of institutions more than economic resources. The study thus enhances our 
understanding of mechanisms for access to local donor- supported institutions. 
 
Il existe tout un pan de la litte´rature qui montre que les institutions appuye´es par les bailleurs de 
fonds en Afrique Subsaharienne (ASS) sont accapare´es par les e´lites locales, mais cette 
litte´rature se demande rarement si ce comportement de´pend ou non des institutions. Si c’est le cas, 
certaines de ces institutions peuvent cependant permettre a` des groupes plus faibles d’exercer 
une certaine influence politique alors que d’autres maintiennent les rapports de force existants. 
Le but de cette e´tude, qui comporte trois e´tudes de cas d’institutions appuye´es par des bailleurs de 
fonds au Burkina Faso, est de comprendre pourquoi des parents proches de chefs traditionnels 
cherchent a` prendre le controˆle de la municipalite´ alors qu’ils ne montrent qu’un inte´reˆt limite´ pour 
obtenir le controˆle; des groupements villageois et de la coope´rative d’e´lectricite´. L’article de´fend 
l’ide´e que bien que les acteurs locaux soient ge´ne´ralement attire´s par les rentes de 
de´veloppement lie´es aux institutions appuye´es par les bailleurs de fonds, les parents des chefs 
traditionnels semblent donner une plus grande importance a` la valeur symbolique des institutions 
qu’aux ressources e´conomiques. L’e´tude renforce ainsi notre compre´hension des me´canismes 
d’acce`s aux institutions appuye´es par les bailleurs de fonds. 
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1. Introduction 
The building of local institutions based on imported Western concepts has been central to 
development aid to West Africa since the beginning of the 1970s (Gentil 1986; Jacob 1994). Over 
time the scope for local institution-building has gradually widened, and the last 15 years has been 
strongly linked to decentralization efforts. This has led to the establishment of institutions of local 
government, such as new municipalities in most West African countries.In many cases it has also led 
to the privatization of traditional government functions such as provision of water and electricity by 
establishing new institutions such as user committees or user cooperatives (Ribot 1999; Bierschenk 
and Olivier de Sardan 2003; Oue´draogo 2003; Manor 2004). 
Institutions created or supported by development agencies generally have the immediate aim of 
serving as vehicles for transfers of development resources in order to pursue a variety of 
development goals such as erosion control, income generation, literacy training and the provision of 
health care, water and electricity. Meanwhile, the long-term objective is that these institutions should 
evolve into local democratic institutions in line with institutional models imported from the West. 
The vision is that democratic rules conveyed by new institutions will gradually erode traditional norms 
of leadership based on seniority and norms of favouring kin, ethnic groups and clientelist networks 
related to the ruling elite (Olivier de Sardan 2004, p. 9). Achieving such objectives is complicated by 
the fact that externally supported institutions seldom fit into a homogenous social setting without 
some conflict or power struggles. On the contrary, such institutions open up new arenas for 
contestation, rivalry and positioning. Often old rivalries are sharpened and fought out and new 
alliances or power constellations may be formed, challenging old-established social positions of 
control and power (Bierschenk 1988; Crehan and Von Oppen 1988; Elwert and Bierschenk 1988). 
Among donor organizations, there seems to be a generally optimistic attitude regarding what it is 
possible to achieve by building new decentralized institutions in terms of democracy and pro-poor 
development (see, e.g., IBRD 1996, p. 151; Donnelly-Roark, Ouedraogo, and Ye 2001, 33), while the 
academic literature generally presents more pessimistic and nuanced views. Ju¨tting et al. (2005, p. 
627) claim that decentralization serves the poor, but only under specific conditions, while Crook (2003, 
p. 77) insists that ‘decentralization is unlikely to lead to more pro-poor outcomes without a serious 
effort to strengthen and broaden accountability mechanisms at both local and national levels’. A 
large body of literature shows that beneficiaries of decentralization tend to be wealthier groups, and 
that in many cases external resources are captured by local elites (Lavigne Delville 1992; Blundo 
1994; Mongbo 1994; Diawara 1996; Crook and Manor 1998; Gueneau and Lecomte 1998; Crook and 
Sverrison 2001; Vedeld 2003; Ha˚rsmar 2004; Nijenhuis 2003; Platteau 2004). This literature, however, 
does not discuss whether elite capture is contingent on differences in institutions. If this is the case, some 
institutions may provide political leverage for weaker groups, while others may sustain existing or 
traditional relations of power. 
This article is intended to help fill this gap.1 Through empirical research into three cases of 
institutions in a small provincial town in Burkina Faso, it will show why certain institutions are more 
prone to capture by local elites than others. More specifically, it addresses the question of why political 
arenas opened by different types of donor-supported local institutions attract distinct social groups. It 
will be demonstrated that in this case relatives of traditional chiefs are especially attracted to the new 
municipality, which symbolically competes with the local chieftaincy institution, but show less 
interest in village groups and the electricity cooperative, which have symbolic importance of a 
different kind. Based on this example, the article argues that, while local actors are generally attracted 
by resources from donor-supported institutions, the symbolic importance of the competing institutions 
seems to be greater than tangible economic resources, and that this contributes to explaining why the 
current decentralization process in Burkina Faso brings relatives of traditional chiefs back into office. 
In the following section, I will introduce the three cases of institutions being examined here and 
the concept of arena. I will then present the research methodology and examine the social organization 
and main social contradictions in the locality being investigated. Against this background, I address 
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 which motives actors pursue in engaging and participating in the arenas opened up and which social 
groups participate in specific arenas. These questions are addressed in three subsequent sections dealing 
with the three empirical cases: village group, municipality and cooperative. The concluding section 
explores the question of why certain institutions are more prone to elite capture than others. 
2. Local institutions as political arenas 
In this article, with Scott (1995, p. 33) I define institutions as ‘cognitive, normative and 
regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour’. This means 
that institutions such as municipalities, village groups and user cooperatives are partly constituted by a 
set of formal rules on which they are based, as well as a number of informal rules in respect of cognitive 
and normative structures. This emphasis on informal rules is especially important in the African 
context, where formal rules are constantly being negotiated (see, e.g., Berry 1993; Lund 1999), and 
where informal rules are often more important than formal ones (see, e.g., Bierschenk and Olivier de 
Sardan 1998, p. 38).2 
The three cases of institution have been selected as examples of local donor-supported 
institutions, but with different origins and goals. The first case, village groups, is well known 
throughout West Africa under the term groupements villageois (Lavigne Delville 1992). In the area 
studied, village groups have served as important vehicles for development aid during the last 25 years 
(Buijs 1980; McCall, Fleming, Koussoube, and McPherson 1986; Puget 1999). They have been given 
a number of functions, such as technology transfer in areas like animal traction, pesticides and 
fertilizers. Furthermore, they have been used to transfer knowledge, such as  enrichment  of  organic  
nutrients,  anti-erosion  measures,  literacy  training  and  income- generating activities (e.g. vegetable 
gardening). They have also been used to pool resources, as with Western cooperative societies, and 
have run mills for cereals, cereal banks and small distribution centres for subsidized cattle fodder. 
During the last ten years these groups have increasingly served as ‘gate-keeping institutions’ for new 
micro-credit schemes (Puget 1999). 
The second case of institution, the ‘new’ municipality, stems from a decentralization reform of a sort 
that has been strongly encouraged by donors since the beginning of the 1990s (Sawadogo 2001, 
pp. 209, 218). In Burkina Faso, this process resulted in the creation of 33 municipalities in the first 
round in 1995 and in a total of 45 municipalities in 2000. The process is ongoing, and in April 2006 
municipal councils were elected in 357 urban and rural municipalities (www.ceni.bf). The 
municipalities officially serve at least two functions. First, they are intended to transfer administrative 
functions to lower levels of the state bureaucracy, what is usually called the deconcentration of 
administrative functions (Rondinelli 1981). This embraces functions such as registration of births, 
land registration and the management of schools. The intention is also to transfer decisive power 
to an elected council, which has independent authority over well-defined areas, as well as the 
authority to collect taxes, what is usually called the devolution of state power. However, in the Burkinabe 
context, during the field research for this article in 2002 these municipalities mainly served as a means to 
obtain access to development resources, such as roads, schools, water provision and marketplaces, 
with the devolution of state power lagging behind (AMBF 2000, p. 33). 
The third case of institution is the consumer-owned electricity cooperative, whose main objective 
is to provide its members with electricity. This type of ownership of electricity companies is new 
in Burkina Faso, and is one way among others of organising the electrification of rural areas. The 
donors’ objectives, however, are not only to provide townspeople with electricity, but also to 
establish a new institution, the cooperative electricity society, conceived as a means of the 
electrification of rural areas on a private basis. This vision is nurtured by the fact  that  the  cooperative  
society  was  the  institution  responsible  for  a  fair  part  of  the electrification of rural areas in such 
different countries as Denmark, France and the United States (Van der Vleuten 1998; Masse´ 2004). 
The institutions constituting the three cases are different in a number of ways, and especially in terms 
of institutional maturity and in their relationship to the state. However, for the purposes of  the  
argument  in  this  article,  it  is  important  to  emphasize  the  following  common characteristics. 
These institutions are emerging in a development context, they are strongly supported by 
development agencies, and they have been ‘imported’ into the African context in the sense that they are 
modelled on Western institutions and are different from existing ones.3 This article is based on the 
assumption that externally supported institutions open new ‘arenas’ for struggle over resources (see, 
e.g., Bierschenk 1988; Crehan and Von Oppen 1988; Elwert and Bierschenk 1988; IBRD 1996). In 
this context the concept of an arena refers to ‘social  locations  or  situations  in  which  contests  
over  issues,  resources,  values  and representations take place. That is, they are social and spatial 
locations where actors confront each  other,  mobilize  social  relations  and  deploy  discursive  and  
other  cultural  means  for attainment of specific ends’ (Long 2001, p. 59). 
This means that an arena constitutes a bounded frame or stage where a specific conflict or dispute 
takes place. The arena thus defines the actors involved and the issues, resources and discourses that 
are being fought over (Long 2001). This implies that development projects, cooperatives and ‘local 
politics’ are all arenas (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 1997, p. 240). An arena is not necessarily spatially 
restricted, and only in some cases is it spatially defined, as in the case of a village. When dealing with 
development interventions, contestation over issues such as resources and values is generally not limited to 
a spatial setting, but can often involve geographically distinct actors. This implies that, although an arena is 
defined in terms of confrontation between actors, it does not necessarily involve a face-to-face 
confrontation. Actors can participate in struggles in different arenas at the same time, and arenas often 
overlap or are interlocking. What happens in one arena might easily influence an outcome in other arenas 
(Long 2001). 
In the present analysis, the extent of an arena depends on the conflict or resources at stake within it. 
Institutions such as cooperatives and village groups may constitute arenas in which only members of 
the institutions are the actors. In these cases, the arena is spatially confined to the town inasmuch as the 
members live in the town. Election to the municipality constitutes an arena that is spatially much wider 
than the village and which includes actors from the regional town, the capital and even foreign actors, 
because political parties in the capital and townspeople abroad (ressortissants) may be important actors 
too. In this case, the local constituency constitutes a specific arena, as only members of the 
constituency have the right to vote. This arena is thus spatially defined and is a subset of the wider 
‘election’ arena. Resources are both material (economic) and symbolic. Symbolic resources recall 
Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic capital, which comprises social relations, status, prestige and honour. 
Symbolic capital, e.g. in terms of honour, can be converted to economic capital at a later stage and vice 
versa (Bourdieu 1977, pp. 177 – 183). 
Development interventions can be perceived as constituting a special arena, the ‘development 
interface’, which is different from other arenas in various ways (see Long 2001). It is 
characterized by the relative abundance of economic resources, which enables struggles over both 
economic and symbolic resources (Bierschenk 1988; Crehan and Von Oppen 1988; Elwert and 
Bierschenk 1988). 
3. Research methodology 
The empirical data presented in this article is based on about six months of fieldwork in 2002 and 2003 in 
two small towns in northern Burkina Faso. Since only one of the towns, Sebba, had all three types of 
institution, this article is mainly based on empirical data from there, while findings from the other town, 
Seytenga, will be used to provide extra support for some of the arguments. Various methods were 
combined during the empirical research, and the field data gathered were mainly qualitative. Besides 
observation and participation in daily life in the towns, I used various  rural  appraisal  methods,  such  
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 as  transect  walks  and  wealth-ranking.  However,  a significant amount of data was collected through 
close to 100 formal semi-structured interviews, which were carried out partly as group interviews and 
partly as individual interviews with members  of  the  institutions  studied  and  with  key  individuals  
in  other  local  institutions. Moreover, detailed inventories of ethnic-group membership, family 
relationships and clientelist relationships involving major post-holders in the towns were compiled. 
4. Social organization and social contradictions in Sebba 
Sebba is a small town, situated in the northern part of Burkina Faso. The population mainly consists 
of Fulbe and their former slaves, the Rimaı¨be, while a smaller group of Songhay, Hausa and Mossi have 
moved in since the beginning of the 1970s.4 Fulbe culture, however, is still pervasive (Boesen 1999). 
The common language is Fulfulde, while Islam is the religion of about 98% of the population. 
The town of Sebba has been in existence here for about 200 years, and it is still the centre for the 
emirate, which was founded when Fulbe herders conquered the sedentary agriculturalist population. 
The status of the town as the centre of the emirate has played a principal role in the social life of 
Sebba, partly because the royal family has appropriated resources from the surrounding area, and 
partly because rivalries between competing factions of the royal family have had important 
ramifications for social relations in the town. Meanwhile, Sebba’s role as an administrative centre 
attracted attention and interference from the French colonial machine from the start of the twentieth 
century. Today Sebba has about 5000 inhabitants, and in 1996 obtained administrative status as the 
capital of the newly created Yagha Province, a status which also led to the formation of a municipality 
mainly covering the town’s spatial area (Loyara, Ouedraogo, and Sanou 2000). 
Historical analysis of old conflicts and contradictions in African societies is a valuable entry point for 
understanding present relationships of power (Irwin 1981). Acknowledging that power relations are 
neither simple nor static, my historical analysis of power relations in Sebba revealed a pattern of 
three main social contradictions as important in a historical perspective (Nygaard 2006). The first is 
the ethnic contrast between the former Fulbe masters and their slaves, the Rimaı¨be. Traditionally, the 
Rima ı¨be cultivated, whereas their masters herded. Even after the formal liberation of slaves at the 
beginning of the last century, this division of labour continued, with the Fulbe maintaining their role as 
pastoralists and the Rimaı¨be that of agriculturalists. In the course of time, and especially after two 
periods of drought in 1972 – 73 and 1983 – 84, both Fulbe and Rimaı¨be have become agro-
pastoralists, and the economic differences between the two groups have become less distinct. While the 
dominance of the Fulbe over the Rimaı¨be is strongly embedded culturally, the Rima ı¨be are in many 
cases economically better off than their former masters (Hampshire 2002, p. 29; The´baud 2002, p. 220). 
The second contradiction is between the ruling and rival factions of the royal family. This cleavage 
between two branches or factions can be traced back to about 1935, when the colonial power violated 
the rules of succession to the emirate and enthroned a younger and cooperative brother of the first wife, 
instead of the eldest but less cooperative brother of the second wife. This created an atmosphere of 
envy and mistrust between the sons of the first and second wives and, as a consequence, the old 
compound of the emir was virtually divided into the compound of the newly appointed emir, Baade 
Amiirou, and the compound of his rival, Baade Karmadji. The struggle between the two factions has 
since been nurtured and maintained in various arenas, and the cleavage is still important in 
understanding contemporary power relations in Sebba (Nygaard 2006). 
The third historical social contradiction is between the Islamic Hamallist brotherhood and the 
ruling faction of the royal family.5 The Hamallist brotherhood constituted a significant movement of 
emancipation in the 1940s directed against the colonial power and its collaborators and, although it lost 
some of its importance after independence, the son of the former Hamallist leader, who was imprisoned 
by the French in the 1940s, still plays an important role as a centre of political power opposed to the 
ruling branch in Sebba (Nygaard 2006). 
Since the creation of the first political parties in 1946, these three old contradictions have become 
visible to a great extent through affiliation to different national political parties. While the ruling 
faction has generally been linked to the ruling party, the rival faction has mainly supported the 
opposition. Likewise, while the ruling faction has always been in opposition to the Hamallist movement, 
the competing branch has maintained its affiliation with the Hamallists and forged strategic alliances 
with them. Both the political and the religious arenas have linked the local struggle to national politics. 
Despite their extent, animosities and contradictions between the former masters and their former 
slaves have never given rise to direct, organized confrontations between the two groups. Contradictions 
have rather been embedded in other social and political movements, such as the Hamallist movement, 
the Sankara revolution and to some extent in affiliations with distinct political parties.6 
However, these contradictions are penetrated by a web of clientelist relationships between former 
masters and former slaves, as well as between the ruling branch and a number of Rimaı¨be, whose 
forefathers were entrusted and used as brokers between the royal court and its subjects.7 These 
clientelist relationships are still maintained through exchanges of favours and symbols of belonging, in 
some cases remaining so strong that the Rimaı¨be feel greater loyalty to their former masters than to their 
own ethnic group, while in other cases the ethnic group identity may be the strongest. 
Following this brief presentation of my historical analysis of the main social contradictions involved 
in this example, I will return to the main questions in this article: the motives for participating in 
local institutions, and the composition of the social groups that do so. I will address these questions 
one at a time for the three cases, the village groups, the municipality and the cooperative, before 
proceeding to offer conclusions. Supported by the observation that close relatives of traditional chiefs are 
especially attracted to institutions, which symbolically compete with chieftaincy institutions, I will argue 
that the symbolic importance of competing institutions may be more important than tangible economic 
resources. 
5. Case I: Village groups 
Motives for participating 
According to the prevailing development discourse, a main argument for supporting village groups 
is to engage women in income-generating activities (see e.g. McCall et al. 1986; Buijsrogge 1989, 
p. 157; Danida 2001, p. 60). My research, on the contrary, shows how village groups to a large extent 
serve as vehicles for access to resources coming from external donors, and that most activities can 
accordingly be interpreted as mainly symbolic activities serving to maintain relations to donors rather 
than to generate incomes (Nygaard 2006). In this section, I will provide some examples substantiating 
this argument. 
First, it is obvious that motives for participating in village groups are individual and varied. This 
means that, while access to donor resources seems to be a dominant motive, there are obviously also 
other motives at work, such as the social and political community and the attraction of symbols of 
modernity (Crewe and Harrison 1998, p. 168). Secondly, motives are contingent on one’s position in 
these groups, i.e. leader, committee member or ordinary member. How motives depend on positions is 
illustrated by an excerpt from an interview with a village group secretary, in which she explains why 
the village group has abandoned a vegetable gardening project around an artificial waterhole (boulis): 
 
Madame [Baˆ] has, during the campaign, given 15,000 FCFA to clean all this [the garden area] and furthermore she has 
given 15,000 FCFA to erect the fence. Now she is not free. She can’t do it, because she must not leave her house 
[because her husband died]. Every time when she was . . . [before], she came to see if the people (les gens) had worked 
well, but now when she must not go out and because of the lack of water, she has said that she will drop it this year. We will 
see. (Interview No. 71, 06-02-03, emphasis added) 
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 First, it is remarkable that the secretary depicts the leader as if she were the embodiment of the village 
group. It is the leader, not the treasurer or the village group, who gives money for cleaning and a 
new fence. Like an employer, the leader has the power and decides whether or not the women go to the 
garden. In this example, therefore, the village group leader is playing a double role. On the one 
hand, she acts as a development broker, who has established and maintained contact between the 
donor community and at the village group. On the other hand, she acts as a patron within the group, for 
which she takes the decisions. This double position as broker and patron can be beneficial for the leader 
in economic terms, but the position is also an asset that can be exchanged at a later stage for positions in 
other, more profitable political arenas. The latter is illustrated by the fact that the leaders of most 
village groups were politicians themselves or close relatives of politicians. 
The excerpt further shows that, when the leader is not able to exercise control, other members 
do not show any interest in gardening or the project. When directly asked, members could not point to 
any income generation from the project except for their own consumption, which is why they 
eventually abandoned it. On the other hand, through many years of experience with the donor community, 
the leader is very knowledgeable about prevailing donor values, and she therefore pushes members to 
conduct these mainly symbolic activities to demonstrate commitment and entrepreneurship in order 
to increase opportunities for new projects, to the benefit of both her and her group. Meanwhile, in this 
case she failed because her husband died, and she was not allowed to leave the house for a while. 
My research reveals that the indirect benefits of being connected to a project, the so-called 
development rent, can be considerable and can easily outweigh the benefits of engaging in riskier 
income-generating activities.8 
In the case of village groups, development rents were diverse and comprised subsidized and scarce 
resources such as cereals for food aid, subsidized cattle fodder and cheap credit, as well as training and 
study tours, which were remunerated on a per diem basis. Along with this came a not inconsiderable 
number of illicit resources in terms of unpaid credit, the misappropriation of project resources and the 
diversion of investments for other purposes. Finally, there were examples of links with the 
development community, which provided access to jobs for village group members or their families, 
jobs which, in economic terms, were far more important to the family than sporadic activities in the 
village groups. It may therefore be a rational choice to engage in highly symbolic activities in order to 
maintain access to these development rents. 
While, during their lifetimes, these village groups had engaged in a number of projects, enduring 
profitable and income-generating activities were rare. Village groups generally phased out or lost 
profitable activities such as mills to private enterprises. Similarly, they seldom embarked on 
activities on their own  initiative that  competed with existing  enterprises in profitable markets, such 
as mills or cereal banks. This indicates that the locals do not perceive village groups as the best 
institution to manage profitable activities. On the contrary, engaging in activities such as collective fields, 
vegetable gardening and even small dairies are important in releasing new donor funding because they 
are examples of tangible activities on the ground and because they are symbols that reflect donor values 
such as entrepreneurship, community in work and women’s empowerment. Similar examples of how 
symbolic activities ensure a continuing flow of resources are depicted by Puget (1999), who conducted 
research in the same region of Burkina Faso, and in a body of literature from SSA on the same subject 
(see e.g. Blundo 1994; Floquet 1994; Mongbo 1994; Crewe and Harrison 1998; Laurent 1998). 
Who participated? 
According to the formal rules, village groups should be inclusive institutions open to all citizens in the 
town. In much of the donor literature, village groups are implicitly described as organizations 
representing the whole village or small town.9 My own research, however, reveals that the formal rules 
have little importance in this case. In practice, village groups are mainly exclusive institutions, and 
membership follows local norms of community such as families, factions, ethnic groups or 
clientelist networks. This observation is not new and has been described in other investigations in 
the field (Blundo 1994; Jacob 1994; Puget 1999). My point here, however, is that this exclusion works 
especially to the detriment of the poorest strata of the population, who have poor networks as well as less 
time to engage in ‘risk-reducing’ institutions such as village groups. 
I found that the poorest are excluded at two levels. First, it is the middle-income and richest 
groups that participate in village groups. In Sebba, the families dominating the four village groups 
subject to investigation were perceived as belonging to the medium- and high-income groups. These 
groups were also among the most active in the sense that they had been connected to the aid system 
and had received funding and carried out activities. The sporadic information available about the 
‘less active’ or dormant groups in Sebba indicates that village groups, which mainly consisted of people 
from the poorest and most marginalized strata, had not been able to obtain funding because they had 
weaker connections to the aid system and in some cases were subject to ethnic exclusion. 
Secondly, the poorest strata within the village groups seemed to benefit less than the others. The most 
profitable activities undertaken by members of village groups in the research area were access to loans 
and to cheap cattle fodder. My research shows how the poorest people within the group are excluded from 
access to loans, because they are seen as being unable to pay them back. Also, the poorest do not possess 
cattle, so they do not benefit from the cattle fodder. Thus, as Engberg-Pedersen also shows (2002, p. 
178), the poorest are often those who are least suited to exploiting the benefits provided by village 
groups. 
I also investigated how the historical contradictions between the Fulbe and the Rimaı¨be and between 
the ruling and rival factions of the royal family have influenced affiliation to village groups. The 
general picture was that people who had not traditionally been in power saw the village groups as an 
emerging opportunity to exert some economic and political leverage, while the ruling faction of the royal 
family hardly showed any interest in them. One village group, for example, almost exclusively 
comprised members from one rival branch of the royal family, while other groups consisted of people 
from a group of wealthy and former entrusted Rimaı¨be in collaboration with Fulbe and non-Fulbe 
newcomers. Because of their strong position in other political arenas, the ruling faction, and especially 
its oldest segments, seems to have found the benefits of engaging in village groups to be less than the 
inconvenience. They use what Engberg- Pedersen (2002, p. 177) has termed ‘the strategy of evasion’, 
i.e.  they  have  chosen  to protect themselves from the implicit social and political implications of 
such interventions. 
Although the younger segments of the ruling faction seem to be showing an increasing interest in 
accessing their share of development rents, the general picture remains that the ‘middle’ social group, 
consisting of newcomers, former slaves, women and nobles from rival branches of the royal family, 
are mainly attracted by village groups, while the poorest are generally excluded. 
6. Case II: The municipality 
Motives for participating 
The first election to the municipal council in Sebba in 2000 turned out to be a big social and political 
event. The campaign was colourful, and impressive resources were mobilized. The themes in the 
election campaign mainly concerned who would be best positioned as a development broker to achieve 
donor funding for infrastructure projects, but underlying this, the election mainly centred on which of the 
two rival factions of the royal family would be able to place their candidate in office as mayor. Since 
1935, the two factions had in various ways fought for control over the emirate, of which the new 
municipality was seen as a ‘modern’ version.10 The mayor, like the emir, was perceived as ‘chief of the 
town’, and although belonging to two institutions which, according to the formal rules, are very 
different, the position of mayor was honourable and on a symbolic level comparable to the position of 
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 emir. 
Ethnicity, belonging to the two competing factions within the royal family and religious 
affiliation to the Hamallist brotherhood were still markers of identity that played significant roles in 
patterns of affiliation to different political parties. Political programmes, on the other hand, had little 
importance, and, as I also found in my second research locality, affiliation to parties was to a large 
extent structured along lines of kin and factions, and nurtured through clientelist relations with political 
leaders (see also Maı¨ga 2004, p. 86). With a number of exceptions, the ruling party, the CDP, was led 
by the ruling faction, Baade Amiirou, while the main opposition party, the CDF, was led by the 
competing faction, Baade Karmadji. While these two parties were in direct opposition to each other in the 
factual competition to win back the emirate, a third party, the PAI, mainly led by a group of the emir’s 
former entrusted Rimaı¨be and other wealthy Rimaı¨be, were in an intermediate position, seen in this 
perspective. Leaders were non-Fulbe and from an ethic perspective were in opposition to both the ruling 
and the rival factions. In previous parliamentary elections, however, this social group had formed 
strategic alliances with the rival branch in confronting the ruling faction. While there may be many 
reasons for such alliances, one seems to be the historical legacy of the Hamallist movement, which 
embraced both the rival faction and the Rimaı¨be in their struggle with the ruling faction. 
Thus, symbolic resources were obviously important at the local level. However, in the wake of the 
Zongo affair,11 when the ruling party had been weakened nationally (Hagberg 2002), it was also of 
great symbolic importance for the ruling party to defeat the opposition in municipal elections. 
Who participated? 
Sebba had historically been a stronghold of the opposition, and therefore the result of the election 
was a surprise. The ruling party, the CDP, came out as the winner with eight seats, while the CDF and 
PAI won four and three seats respectively. There are several factors that may explain this. In the 
light of the importance of regaining the emirate, the fact that the elected mayor was the son of the 
former emir seems to have been an important asset in his bid to get elected.12 Secondly, the fact that he 
had been working as a prefet for most of his life was also an advantage in trying to convince people that 
he was well positioned to influence the government and donors to bring new projects to Sebba. 
Thirdly, better access to government resources seemed to be important. Both the ruling party and the 
opposition had good connections to well- placed townspeople in the capital, and both were directly 
and indirectly trying to buy votes, either through promises of better positions,  or through direct 
distribution  of ‘envelopes’. However, there was no doubt among those I interviewed in Sebba that the 
ruling party had better access to resources it could distribute than the opposition, and that the quantity 
of distributed resources was important in explaining its victory. Independently of the reasons, 
however, the result of the first election in Sebba was a clear victory for the ruling branch of the royal 
family, as the position as mayor and other influential positions were occupied by relatively old Fulbe 
men who belong to the ruling branch. 
Of course, some patterns are observable that break with this firm picture. Although the Fulbe obtained 
the most important positions in the council, the Rima ı¨be won the most seats, and although most 
councillors were men, one woman managed to be elected. Similarly, although the older generation 
obtained the most important positions, representatives of the young generation also won influential 
positions, and there was an almost uniform distribution of age within the council. These observations 
could be signs of a gradual change in power relationships, but upon further examination it appeared that 
the younger generation in the council were either dependent on family connections to the ruling faction, 
as in the case of the son-in-law of the mayor, or involved in historical clientelist relationships between 
Fulbe and Rimaı¨be families, as in the case of the young opposition leader, the son of a former entrusted 
Rimaı¨be. 
In this case, therefore, the new institution, which was supposed to give democratic leverage to the 
weaker groups, seems instead to have reinforced the old power relations and given office to close 
relatives of the royal family and its clientele. To the extent that the municipality will receive access to 
external development resources, these resources will bring legitimacy to continued rule by these 
existing elites and sustain the options for elite capture rather than the contrary. 
This conclusion is in line with other research on municipal elections in Burkina Faso, which shows 
two interrelated patterns (Otayek 1995, 1999; Maı¨ga 2004). One is that elected mayors have close ties 
of kinship with traditional chiefs, and the other is that local elections are in no way a local affair, and 
that ressortissants return from national and international careers to be elected mayors of their home 
towns. Because national politicians are often the close kin of traditional chiefs, these patterns are 
frequently related. 
7. Case III: The electricity cooperative 
Motives for participating 
The electricity cooperative was a demonstration project conceived by Danida.13 In the project 
document for Danida’s energy sector programme, the local population were seen as the decision- makers 
in the project and were to take decisions on the types of electrical systems to be implemented, 
types of management systems and size and demarcation of the intervention area (Danida 1999, p. 17). 
Under these circumstances, there were various good reasons for people to participate in the political 
arena constituted by the cooperative and to be members of the committee. Being a committee 
member in the cooperative would provide opportunities to control important resources and to 
influence the initial plans for and future expansions of the electricity grid. Seen from the mayor’s 
perspective, gaining control might bring some legitimacy to the municipality, inasmuch as access to 
electricity might be seen as a benefit achieved by the municipality. 
Taking the colourful and fiercely fought election campaign for the municipality into account, it was 
therefore surprising that there was no election campaign for the cooperative. In practice the committee 
for the electricity cooperative was elected according to a consensus made before the donor’s 
representatives showed up for the constitutive assembly. According to interviews, this approach was 
taken mainly because the mayor and other local people were afraid that an open election would 
demonstrate to the donors the high level of conflict in the town and thus place financing of the project 
at risk.  Other explanations  may  be added to explain why competition for leadership of the 
cooperative seems to have been less fierce than for the leadership of the municipality. 
First, the position of leader of the cooperative may be considered less prestigious than that of mayor. 
As one informant expressed it, ‘to be mayor is very honourable. Very honourable. But to participate in the 
cooperative, that is to arrange, to be kept occupied’. This opinion indicates that, while being mayor in 
Sebba was a question of honour and of regaining the emirate, the position of head of the electricity 
cooperative was seen as ordinary work, or maybe even as a form of occupational therapy for former 
leaders. The prestige of being on the committee may have been reduced because of a deeper resistance 
to what are perceived of as the ‘institutions of aid’ (Engberg-Pedersen 2002, p. 177). In contrast to 
the municipality, the cooperative might be related to the local narrative of cooperative institutions, 
which is mainly a narrative of suppression, control and hidden agendas (Nygaard 2006). 
A second explanation may be that political parties were not involved in the election. As a result, 
there was neither an organization to finance a campaign, nor any tradition of sustained public 
campaigning for such a position. While election campaigns were held like football matches, with 
supporters on both sides voicing their support, elections to committees followed local norms of 
decision-making taken by consensus among a small group of notables (Soumane and Bonou 2001, pp. 
18 – 20; Hahonou 2006). This does not suggest that negotiations and struggles were absent, but 
rather that positions were essentially negotiated among a limited group of notables. 
A third explanation could be that there are low expectations of one’s ability to exert real influence 
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 in donor-supported committees. While the position of mayor seems to embody symbolizations of 
autocratic customary power, the experience of participation on user committees for all the different 
types of donor-supported infrastructure, such as wells, health centres, school boards, marketplaces and 
saving banks (caisses populaires), has lowered people’s aspirations as to the possibilities of influence 
(Manor 2004). The present example also contributed to such worries. In spite of the written intentions, 
in practice the project implementation turned out to be a top-down process, mainly implementing a 
predefined electrical system, a predefined management system (the cooperative) and an intervention 
zone presented to the committee members as an optimal solution for both technical and economic 
reasons. So in this case, as so often before (see e.g. White 1996; Michener 1998; Mosse 2001), for the 
donors, participation legitimized predefined solutions, while for the population it was mainly a means 
of being included as consumers in the electricity project. 
Who participated? 
In Sebba, the committee of the cooperative seemed to be ‘wisely’ composed by the inclusion of 
representatives of the ruling faction, Baade Amiirou, the rival faction, Baade Karmadji, and the group of 
entrusted and wealthy Rima ı¨be. The committee also had representatives of the three political parties. 
The mayor, however, had ensured his influence, and there was a high degree of overlap between 
members of the municipal council and of the electricity cooperative. The mayor was president, and the 
first deputy mayor was general secretary. The son-in-law of the mayor, who was the leader of the 
finance commission in the municipality, was chair of the grid committee. However, while the 
ruling and rival factions both had representatives on the committee, the former held the powerful 
positions of president and general secretary, while the rival faction only held one important position, 
that of chair of the grid committee. Other important positions, such as vice-president and treasurer, 
were allocated to two relatively young but dynamic individuals who were descended from the group of 
wealthy Rima ı¨be. 
The committee members were a mixture of various professions. The president and the general 
secretary (i.e. the mayor and his deputy) were retired civil servants. Three people, the vice-president, 
the chair of the grid committee and the chair of the control committee, were all employed at DPEBA, 
the state agency for literacy training. The treasurer, vice-treasurer and a member of the control 
committee were businessmen (commerc¸ants), while the only woman involved owned a small 
restaurant. The last two seats, members on the grid committee and on the control committee, were held by 
a traditional farmer and by the provincial leader of a farmers’ association respectively. 
Besides the leader of the farmers’ association or CRUS, several people were related to the 
development arena at different levels. Although my information about the committee members is not 
exhaustive, it may be illustrated by means of a few examples. One was founder of a local NGO, which 
sought to promote literacy training. Another was village group leader and yet another the son of an 
influential Rimaı¨be, who was identified as a nucleus of village group activity in the town. 
To summarize, the committee mainly consisted of businessmen and well-educated administrators, 
who straddled the boundaries between the administration, the municipality and the NGO sector. The 
mayor, who was said to be responsible for selecting the membership of the committee, had created a 
consensus that was difficult to contest inasmuch as he included representatives of both competing 
factions and of the wealthy Rimaı¨be, but which still left him with control over the committee. The 
mayor seemed to have the support of his deputy and his son-in-law on the municipal council, and also 
to a great extent that of the young and dynamic Rimaı¨be, who saw their interests in being affiliated to 
the ruling party, to which most of the committee members also belonged. As Manor (2004) points 
out, in a context of prevailing clientelist relations, the fact that the committee was in reality appointed 
by the mayor meant that they owed him something in return. Therefore, in spite of various interests being 
represented on the committee, the mayor, and thus a representative of the ruling branch of the royal 
family, seemed to be maintaining a high level of control over the cooperative. 
8. Conclusion 
This article addresses the overall question of why certain institutions are more prone to capture by local 
elites than others. It has been shown that the three institutions examined have created three distinct 
arenas, which have, to some degree, attracted different strategic groups. Patterns in a complex picture 
show that the village group arena attracted people from weaker groups, such as newcomers, former 
slaves, the young, women and nobles from rival factions, while the arena constituted by the 
municipality attracted people belonging to the ruling elites and the rival factions of the emirate. The 
arena created by the electricity cooperative overlaps with those of the village groups and the 
municipality, though being closest to that of the municipality. The poorest strata of the population seem 
generally to be excluded from influence in and the benefits of all three institutions. 
The examination of these arenas from a detailed historical perspective has revealed that historical 
cleavages can be traced back to succession struggles for positions as village chiefs and head of the 
emirate. These struggles have spread to new arenas and been re-ignited by new institutional 
dynamics, such as national party politics. The factional cleavages that can be identified have had 
significant influence in the three arenas under review. In the arena of village groups, cleavages were 
visible in the sense that, in the majority of groups, membership was structured according to family 
membership, ethnic origin, age sets and factions, while only a few groups attempted to straddle the two 
rival factions. The arena of the municipality, on the other hand, was seen as a new and important arena 
in which the former struggle could be continued, mainly because of its symbolic meaning in terms of 
regaining the emirate. In the arena of the electricity cooperative, the consensus that was constructed 
maintained control in the hands of the ruling faction, while at the same time helping maintain a 
balance between factions, political parties and ethnic groups. 
This article has substantiated the argument that different institutions comprise distinct arenas for 
struggles over resources. It has been shown that these arenas attract actors from different strategic 
groups, and that the composition of the actors depends to a large degree on the symbolic resources that are 
at stake. Institutions that, symbolically, compete with chieftaincy institutions (traditional authority) may 
attract relatives of traditional chiefs (the ruling faction) more than other externally supported 
institutions. It is suggested that this may be an important element in explaining why the current 
decentralization process in Burkina Faso seems to sustain traditional relations of power, rather than 
providing political leverage for weaker groups. 
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Notes 
1. In a recent essay, Manor (2004) takes some initial steps in this direction by addressing differences between elected 
councils at lower levels in the political system and user committees responsible for donor-supported infrastructure, such 
as water, health and education. Manor’s main hypothesis is that user committees are ‘damaging’ decentralization efforts in 
respect of local elected councils. Manor bases his hypothesis on the observation that, while user committees often control 
important resources and rest on a questionable democratic mandate, elected councils, which are characterized by more 
transparent and democratic elections, often lack adequate resources. 
2. This understanding of institutions also acknowledges the work of Cleaver (2002), which, through the concept of 
institutional bricolage, shows that institutions are not built or transferred whole to a new context but rather evolve as a 
patchwork of bits and pieces of both new and existing institutions. 
3. The three institutions are all different from traditional institutions in a number of respects. Some development 
practitioners have argued that village groups are close to traditional organizations, such as ‘age groups’, ‘working groups’ 
or ‘credit groups’, which can be found in Burkina Faso among the Fulani and Mossi. These traditional groups, however, 
are based on rotating aid principles, instead of common ownership of the means of production, as in the case of village 
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 groups. Common ownership was traditionally practised only within the extended family. (For further discussion, see 
Oue´draogo 1990, pp. 41 – 43; Hagberg 2001, p. 54; Nygaard 2006, pp. 196 – 201.) 
4. The terms Fulani (English) and Peul (French) are sometimes used for the entire group of Fulfulde speakers. Here I will 
employ the Fulfulde terms Fulbe and Rimaı¨be to take into account the important socio-political differences between the two 
ethnic groups. Rimaı¨be will be used to indicate non-Fulbe, including caste people and other ethnic groups, who came to 
the area during colonial times (Irwin 1981, pp. 14, 48). For other ethnic groups I will use the French terms. 
5. Hamallism or the Tijanisme de onze grain refers to brotherhoods established by the followers of Cheik Hamahoullah. (For 
the former and present-day political role of Hamallism in Burkina Faso, see, for example, Traore´ 1983; Diallo 1997; 
Diawara 1999, p. 105; The´baud 2002). 
6. The Sankara revolution from 1983 to 1987 was, in spite of its short duration, of paramount importance for social institutions 
in the area, and the revolution still reverberates in contemporary dynamics. During the revolution, traditional chiefs 
were substituted by local revolutionary committees, Comite´s de De´fense de la Re´volution (CDR), and popular 
participation at all levels was encouraged by revolutionary rhetoric (see e.g. Speirs 1991; Tallet 1996). 
7. Here the notion of a patron – client relationship refers to ‘a relationship of personal dependency, excluding kinship 
ties, maintained by reciprocal exchanges of favours, between two persons, the patron and the client, who control 
unequal resources’ (Medard 1982, p. 164). A patron – client relationship is a dyadic relationship between a patron and 
a client. In practice, the client may be the patron of another client, and a multitude of patron – client relationships thus 
come to constitute a patron – client or clientelist network. A broker is one of a group of actors who serve as mediators of 
favours between patrons and clients (Boissevain 1974, p. 148). 
8. I have taken the concept of development rent, la rente de de´veloppement from Olivier de Sardan (1995, p. 160). 
9. The widespread use of the word ‘community’ in terms like community-based organizations (CBOs), community-driven 
development, community-based forestry and community-based natural resource management implicitly conveys a picture 
of village organizations representing the whole community (see, e.g., World Bank 2002a, 2002b). 
10. The emirate was officially abolished in 1977, but informally the last emir still played an important role in the leadership 
of the town. 
11. The murder of the leading editor of a critical newspaper. 
12. This was parallel to what happened in Dori five years earlier, when the former emir was elected mayor. 
13. The Danish Government’s aid agency. 
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